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INTRODUCTION 
 International corporate governance changes swiftly amid major global 
economic developments; these changes are made from country to country—
and now these changes must accommodate an international global 
marketplace. Today, as the pressures of an increasingly interdependent 
global economy are thrust upon the corporate world, corporations and 
boards of directors must be cautious of every decision they make—and of 
the risks associated with such decisions. “Corporate governance involves a 
set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides 
the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined.”1 Corporations today are no longer simply domestic entities; 
  
           *     J.D. expected May 2011, Michigan State University College of Law, specializing 
in Corporate Law; B.S. 2008, Oakland University College of Business Administration. 
Special thanks to Professor Bruce W. Bean for his guidance and support. This note was also 
inspired and written in dedication to my late Uncle, Neil Alan Kay, Esquire. 
 1. PETRI MANTYSAARI, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SHAREHOLDERS 
AS A RULE–MAKER 1, 9 (2005). 
450 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
instead, many corporations are now expanding into international markets 
and adding international representatives to their boards.2 Now more than 
ever companies and their boards of directors must place an increased 
emphasis on their corporate governance procedures.3 Boards of directors 
face numerous challenges in today’s struggling economy.4 Boards of 
directors are faced with the tasks of planning a corporation’s long–term 
strategy, monitoring performance and compliance, determining executive 
compensation, dealing with risk management, handling shareholder proxy 
access, and working effectively as a functioning board of directors.5 As the 
global economy undergoes major changes, governmental agencies in the 
U.S. and abroad are looking into these issues in hopes of stabilizing and 
developing the global economy. Previously, corporate governance issues in 
the U.S. have dealt with actions of the board of directors in the face of 
hostile takeover bids6 and whether the board fulfilled their fiduciary duties 
owed to their shareholders under the “Business Judgment Rule”7—the 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care.8 Since the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis,   these issues now represent only a small part of the puzzle that is 
corporate governance.  
 Part I presents a general background of corporate governance measures 
and principles. This section discusses the importance of the “Business 
Judgment Rule,” the “Enhanced Scrutiny Test,” and the “Entire Fairness 
Test.” This section also discusses the background of corporate governance 
in the areas of shareholder proxy access, executive compensation, risk 
management, and the goals sought by regulation in such areas on an 
international scale. Part I then discusses the controversy surrounding current 
corporate governance issues. Part II discusses and compares the board of 
directors’ duties regarding the issues of executive remuneration and risk 
management.9 Parts III and IV discuss the trends of international corporate 
governance, the impact it will have globally, and potential resolutions to the 
upcoming problems that face international corporate governance. Part IV 
will also discuss potential solutions to the problems facing corporations in 
the United States and European Union.10 
  
 2. See generally Russ Banham How GLOBAL Is Your Board?, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, 
Nov/Dec 2009, at 58. 
 3. Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Risk Management and the 
Board of Directors (Nov. 2009) [hereinafter Board of Directors]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz on Some Thoughts for 
Boards of Directors in 2010 (Nov. 30, 2009) at 1–3 [hereinafter Thoughts for Boards]. 
 6. See, e.g., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 7. “The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under 
the direction of a board of directors . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2010). 
 8. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
 9. See infra Part I, Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III, Part IV. 
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I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MEASURES 
A. United States 
United States corporate governance principles are “grounded in the 
common interests of shareholders, boards and management teams in the 
corporate objective of long–term value creation, the accountability of 
management to the board, and ultimately the accountability of the board to 
shareholders for such long–term value creation.”11 Stockholders are 
suppliers of capital for corporations and are expected “to want corporate 
efficiency, honesty, productivity and profitability.”12 The corporate 
governance responsibilities for a board of directors are cumbersome and 
require that directors act as the primary vehicle for oversight and 
accountability.13 In dealing with this daunting task, directors are faced with 
tough decisions: how to organize the board, how the board should function, 
and what priorities the board should set for the corporation.14  
Corporate governance in the United States typically follows the lead of 
the Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(“DGCL”)—which because of its well established legal history of dealing 
with the complexities of corporate and business law has been established as 
a leading authority in the field.15 Corporations choose to incorporate in 
Delaware because of the flexibility allowed by the DGCL.16 In order to 
understand the general principles and background of corporate governance 
in Delaware and the United States, the first step is to understand the DGCL 
statute and the goals it attempts to accomplish through established case law.  
The relationship between the board of directors of a corporation and its 
shareholders is akin to an “agency” relationship between an agent and 
principal.17 Courts have commonly recognized that corporations are 
organized and continued primarily for the profit of the stockholders.18 
  
 11. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., KEY AGREED PRINCIPLES TO STRENGTHEN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR U.S. PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES 5 (2008) [hereinafter KEY 
AGREED PRINCIPLES]. 
 12. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 1. 
 13. KEY AGREED PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 5. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See About Agency, DEL.  DEP’T ST.: DIV.  CORPS., 
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2011) [hereinafter 
About Agency]. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (“Agency is the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a “principal”) manifests assent to another person 
(an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s 
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”). 
 18. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“The powers of 
the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the 
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Within this agency relationship, laws are set in place in order to protect 
shareholders from abuse of the agency relationship. Actions of the board of 
directors must align with specific standards of conduct; they must fulfill the 
fiduciary duty of care19 and the duty of loyalty.20 Delaware Courts—along 
with other U.S. courts—follow three different standards of review.21 These 
standards of review are the: (1) Business Judgment Rule, (2) Entire Fairness 
Test, and (3) Enhanced Scrutiny Test. The “Business Judgment Rule” 
protects decisions made by the board of directors.22 There are also pre–
conditions that must be met before the board is accorded protection under 
the “Business Judgment Rule.”23 These pre–conditions are five–fold.24 First, 
the board must exercise “process due–care” in coming to an informed 
decision.25 Second, the board must exercise reasonable business judgment.26 
Third, the board must be composed of disinterested and independent 
directors, which establishes that the board had no conflict of interest.27 
Fourth, there must be an absence of fraud or illegality in the transaction 
made by the board to demonstrate that the board acted lawfully.28 Lastly, the 
board must show that the decision is attributed to any rational business 
purpose.29 However, when fraud, illegality, self–dealing or gross negligence 
are present, the “Business Judgment Rule” does not apply; instead, Courts 
apply the “Entire Fairness Test.”30  
The “Entire Fairness Test” has two parts: fair dealing and fair price.31 
Fair dealing relates to the circumstances surrounding the transaction: the 
timing, or, in other words “how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, 
disclosed to the directors and how approval from the directors and 
stockholders were obtained.”32 On the other hand, fair price looks towards 
the economic and financial considerations of a proposed course of action.33  
  
reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to 
devote them to other purposes.”). 
 19. See generally Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858. 
 20. See generally Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
 21. See generally Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927–28 
(Del. 2003). 
 22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2010). 
 23. See generally Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858. 
 24. See generally Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz on Takeover 
Law and Practice (2009) at 23–27 [hereinafter Takeover Law and Practice]. 
 25. Id at 24–26. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id at 24–25. 
 30. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (en banc). 
 31. Id. at 711. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (stating that “[r]elevant market factors: assets, market value, earnings, future 
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s 
stock.”).at 711 (“Relevant market factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, 
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In determining the overall fairness of a transaction entered into by a board, 
both parts of the “Entire Fairness Test” must be met.34 Furthermore, the 
“Entire Fairness Test” requires a duty of candor as part of fair dealing.35 
However, when a board makes a decision that looks self–interested, 
Delaware courts review using the “Enhanced Scrutiny Test.”36  
The “Enhanced Scrutiny Test” is a takeover test, which, in order to 
satisfy, the board must “show that they had “reasonable grounds for 
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed . . . .”37 
This burden can be satisfied by a showing of “good faith”” and “reasonable 
investigation.”38 Under the “Enhanced Scrutiny Test,” the decision of the 
board must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.39 Additionally, 
boards must show that their chosen action falls within the “range of 
reasonableness” in proportion to the threat posed.40 If the court finds that the 
board satisfied this burden in showing that the decision was within the range 
of reasonableness, then the “Business Judgment Rule” applies.41 However, 
if the court finds the decision of the board to be “draconian,” the “Entire 
Fairness Test” applies.42 In addition to the takeover circumstances that 
implicate the Unocal “Enhanced Scrutiny Test,” another specific subset of 
facts triggers application of the test. When it becomes apparent that the 
breakup of a company is inevitable due to takeover bids, and the board of 
directors then recognizes that the company is for sale, the board’s duties 
owed to the stockholders changes from the preservation of the company as a 
corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the 
stockholder’s benefit.43 At this point, “[t]he directors’ role changes from 
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the 
best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”44  
In an effort to protect the stockholders from directors who may abuse 
the corporation, Delaware Courts have applied the DGCL to preserve 
  
and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock.”) Id. 
at 711. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 701. 
 36. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
 37. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964). 
 38. Id. at 555. 
 39. Unocal, 493 A.2d 955 (applying the “Enhanced Scrutiny Test” is when board 
decisions pertain to defensive measures implemented during or resulting from a perceived 
hostile takeover threat). See also id. (“Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy 
of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 
‘constituencies’ other than shareholders…, the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of 
securities being offered in the exchange.”). 
 40. Unitrin v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1955). 
 41. Id. at 1388. 
 42. Id. at 1387. 
 43. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986). 
 44. Id. at 182. 
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stockholder rights.45 Stockholders are entitled to be present at annual or 
special meetings of the corporation—either by means of remote 
communication or by proxy.46 Stockholders have the right to vote at 
meetings47 and make amendments to the corporation’s Articles of 
Incorporation.48  A survey performed by Directorship Magazine shows that 
since the recent financial crisis, investors have lost confidence in corporate 
boards.49 
These protections are often helpful; yet, it is often easier for small 
investors to remain passive in corporations due to the cost of becoming 
active within the corporation.50 Stockholder activism is commonly regarded 
as a positive aspect of corporate governance;51 however, much of the time 
stockholder activism can be regarded as unnecessary due to the lack of 
sufficient knowledge and expertise in knowing how to vote or what they are 
voting on.52  
1. The Corporate Governance Marketplace Today – Resulting 
Regulation from the Wild Rollercoaster Ride of the Last 
Decade 
Since 2000, market activity has been a rollercoaster ride of peaks and 
valleys.  This has resulted in advancements in the area of corporate 
governance.53 With the “dot–com” bubble bursting between 2000 and 2001, 
the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, and the Enron and WorldCom 
corporate scandals—the markets were extremely unstable.54 Investors began 
to lose confidence in public companies, public accounting, and in the 
marketplace itself as more and more large companies filed for bankruptcy.55 
The market was able to briefly regain some stability until the financial crisis 
of 2008 ensued and resulted in one of the deepest recessions in United 
States history.56 As market recovery continues to remain a focus for 
  
 45. See generally About Agency, supra note 15. 
 46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(a)(2) (West 2010). 
 47. tit. 8, § 212 (West 2010). 
 48. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (West 2010). 
 49. See generally Directorship Editors, What Society Thinks: Where Main Street 
Meets the C-Suite, DIRECTORSHIP – BOARDROOM INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.directorship.com/main-street-meets-c-suite/ [hereinafter Where Main Street 
Meets the C-Suite]. See generally What Society Thinks: Where Main Street Meets the C-
Suite, DIRECTORSHIP – BOARDROOM INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.directorship.com/main-street-meets-c-suite/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
 50. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 1. 
 51. Id. 
         52.     Id. 
 53. N.Y. STOCK EXCH. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 10 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT OF N.Y.S.E.]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 11. 
 56. Id. 
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regulators and investors in the United States, market volatility presently 
continues and investors remain wary of what the future holds.57 In 
particular, investors are concerned with the pace and sustainability of the 
economic recovery in the United States and Europe.58 
As a result of the events of the last decade, there has been increased 
corporate governance and disclosure regulation. In an effort to restore 
investor confidence in capital markets, Congress adopted the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002.59 Sarbanes–Oxley addressed corporate governance in 
several significant ways.60 The Act established the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, thereby regulating public accounting 
companies used by publicly–listed companies; increased independence 
standards for auditors; required certification by officers for quarterly and 
annual reports; and  established up–to–date reporting rules expanding the 
range of current reports.61 Since Sarbanes–Oxley, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has implemented numerous additional 
public disclosure requirements for public companies.62 Since the SEC’s 
adoption of these rules, companies must now provide disclosure for “new 
executive compensation and related person transactions,”63 notice and 
access of proxy materials for shareholder meetings,64 and “enhanced proxy 
statement disclosure regarding risk management, compensation consultants, 
background and qualification of directors, diversity of directors, board 
leadership structure, and real-time disclosure of shareholder meeting 
results.”65 Companies must also provide proxy access policies that allow 
flexibility for longer–term shareholders or shareholder groups that hold at 
least three–percent of the company’s stock for at least three years in order to 
gain access to a company’s proxy statement.66 
In addition to Sarbanes–Oxley’s additional requirements, the New York 
Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) made enhancements to its corporate governance 
  
 57. Id. at 12. 
 58. REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 12. 
 59. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–24, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 60. See generally id. 
 61. See REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 18. 
 62. Id. at 19. 
 63. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Exchange Act 
Release No. 33–8732A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Aug. 29, 2006); see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., 
supra note 53, at 19. 
 64. See Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 
34–56135, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,221 (July 26, 2007); see generally REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 20. 
         65.   See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Exchange Act Release No. 33–9089, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 16, 2009); Proxy Disclosure Enhancements; Correction, Exchange Act 
Release No. 33–9089A, 75 Fed. Reg. 9100 (Feb. 23, 2010); see generally REPORT OF 
N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 20. 
 66. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 
33–9136, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Aug. 25, 2010); see generally REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 20. 
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regulations in the NYSE Listing Requirements at the behest of the SEC.67  
The NYSE also requires that the make–up of boards be comprised of a 
majority of independent directors;68 the independent directors meet 
regularly without management directors for executive meetings held on a 
regular basis;69 companies issue charters for nominating governance, 
compensation and audit committees, where each committee holds specific 
responsibilities for various issues within each committee’s respective 
subject area;70 companies gain shareholder approval for all equity 
compensation plans;71 the CEO annually complete certification of 
compliance with corporate governance standards;72 the company include 
disclosure requirements within proxy materials or annual reports of different 
corporate governance requirements;73 and companies provide disclosure of 
several corporate governance matters on the company’s website.74 On a 
similar note, Delaware General Corporation Law made several changes 
affecting the governance structure of corporations.75 One of the most 
notable changes involved permitting proxy access in a corporation’s 
bylaws.76 
As swiftly as Sarbanes–Oxley followed the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals, other congressional legislation quickly followed the financial 
crisis of 2008 and 2009. Specifically, the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010” (“Dodd–Frank”) made numerous 
significant changes to corporate governance in the United States.77 The 
changes arising from Dodd–Frank mainly addressed financial reform issues 
arising from the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009; numerous topics of 
corporate governance also were addressed in the legislation, including 
public disclosure of compensation, “say on pay,” proxy access, board 
  
 67. REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 18. 
         68.  See N.Y.S.E. Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.01–02 (2009) [hereinafter 
N.Y.S.E.]; see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 18. 
 69. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.03; see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 18. 
 70. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.04–07; see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 18–19. 
 71. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.08; see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 19. 
 72. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.12; see also REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra 
note 53, at 19. 
 73. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.00, .02–05, –.07, .09–11; see also REPORT 
OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 19. 
 74. See N.Y.S.E., supra note 68, § 303A.04–05, –.07(b), .09–10; see also REPORT OF 
N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 19. 
 75. See generally REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 21. 
 76. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (West 2010); see generally REPORT OF 
N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 21. 
 77. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111–203, H.R. 4173 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act]. 
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composition, and independence of committee members.78 Specifically in the 
area of corporate governance, Dodd–Frank authorizes the SEC to adopt 
rules regarding proxy access, requires enhanced stock exchange listing 
standards on independence of compensation committee members and hiring 
of advisors, mandates further disclosure of the relationship between 
financial performance and executive compensation, and demands corporate 
policies regarding clawback of executive compensation in particular 
situations.79 The implementation of new corporate governance regulations—
whether followed under the DGCL, NYSE, SEC or Congress—attempt to 
provide greater investor confidences in the capital markets. Resulting 
impacts from such regulations extend beyond the United States’ borders and 
have a profound impact globally on international firms. 
B. European Union History, General Principles, and Goals 
The principal focus of European Union company law is the freedom of 
establishment.80 Corporate governance regulation in the EU focuses on: (1) 
freedom to decide what form the company should take in the EU, (2) 
widespread coordination of regulating securities markets and financial 
reporting in the EU,81 and (3) EU binding rules and non–binding 
Commission recommendations.82 Company law in the EU has a minimal 
number of binding rules that make up the field of corporate governance.83 
Even so, regulations exist in the area of share capital and mergers or 
divisions which are within the breadth of EU law.84 In addition to the 
binding rules, non–binding EU Commission recommendations exist relating 
to the role and compensation of directors, quality assurance baseline 
standards for statutory audits and the independent status of the statutory 
auditors.85 The European Community Treaty (“EC Treaty”) acts in 
furtherance of the principal goal of EU company law by prohibiting any 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of citizens of Member States in 
the territory of another Member State within the EU.86  
Early on, European Community institutions were wrought with 
disorganization; no clear–cut goal or agreed upon rationale for company law 
  
 78. See REPORT OF N.Y.S.E., supra note 53, at 22. 
 79. See Dodd–Frank Act. 
 80. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 35. 
 81. Id. (“The disclosure of information to investors is largely governed by derivative 
EU law.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 43,  Feb. 26, 2001, 
2006 O.J. (C321) 39 (as in effect 2006) (now TFEU art. 49) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
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existed.87 After several Company Law Directives failed, the Commission 
took aim at passing a Statute for the European Union.88 Starting in the 
1990s, the EU company law legislative process has changed allowing more 
political deference to national laws of Member States, including more 
references to national rules of Member States in the legislative proposals.89 
The legal rationale behind this methodology lies in the principle of 
“subsidiarity.”90 This harmonization approach allowed for more flexibility 
which ultimately “resulted in the adoption of the Regulation of the 
European Company Statute (Societas Europaea) in October 2001.”91 
Presently, the traditional continental European approach to corporate 
governance is commonly followed, which assumes that companies will 
finance privately opposed to the more recent trend of corporations publicly 
financing through capital markets.92 However, companies are regulated and 
must still follow mandatory provisions of Company Company Law, which 
were put into effect to protect minority stockholders and creditors.93 In the 
past, EU legislation concentrated on the maintenance and alteration of 
capital, representation of the company and its transactions with third parties, 
financial reporting standards, and issues regarding disclosure of information 
to investors.94  
In 2003 the Commission proposed its Action Plan.95 The goals of the 
plan sought: (1) strengthening stockholders’ rights along with providing 
protection for employees, creditors and other parties interacting with 
companies and (2) promoting efficiency and competitiveness of business, 
specifically targeting issues of cross-border transactions.96 The Commission 
believed that the European regulatory framework required modernization 
and explained that its reasoning occurred because of: (i) the increasing trend 
of European companies operating cross-border within the internal market; 
  
 87. See MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 37. 
 88. Id. at 37. 
 89. Id. at 38. 
 90. EC Treaty art. 5 (as in effect 2006) (now TFEU art. 5) (“In areas which do not 
fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action  . . . only if and in so 
far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community.”). GERT–JAN VOSSESTEIN, MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND 
ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION-A PLAN TO MOVE FORWARD 
19 (2010) [hereinafter MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND ENHANCING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE]. 
 91. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 38. See also Council Regulation 2157/2001/EC, of 
8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE), 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1. 
 92. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 47. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 47–48. 
 95. Commission Proposal for Recommendations on Modernising Company Law and 
Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward, at 1, 
COM (2003) 284 final (May 21, 2003) [hereinafter Modernising Company Law]. 
 96. Id. at 8–9. 
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(ii) the ongoing incorporation of European capital markets; (iii) the high-
speed of growth in new information and communication technologies; (iv) 
the imminent expansion of the European Union to ten new Member States; 
and (v) the disastrous effect of financial scandals.97 
European Company Law protects stockholders through the use of 
directives.98 These directives are implemented within EU member states “to 
the extent necessary”99 with the perspective that such stockholder 
safeguarding directives will become standard and mutually similar 
throughout the European Community.100 In following EU Company Law 
and the objective of freedom of establishment, the EC Treaty also provides 
that any procedure which would stand in the path of the freedom of 
establishment, by means of directives will be abolished.101 The principles 
behind the adoption of Article 44(2)(g) of the EC Treaty rest on the premise 
that allowing freedom of establishment based on a minimum number of 
requirements allows easier start–up for companies to establish themselves in 
different Member States where the regulatory structure is comparable; they 
also rest upon the idea of building trust between firms which enter into 
cross-border economic relationships102 by “ensuring legal certainty in intra-
Community operations” due to the existence of common safeguards. 103  
In addition to freedom of establishment, European Union Company 
Law seeks to accomplish many other goals. European Union company law 
seeks to remove obstacles to trade that interfere with the internal market and 
adjust the structures of production to the European Community 
(“Community”) sphere.104 Companies transact business beyond national 
boundaries, creating choice of law problems; these conflicts between laws 
of conflicting Member States give rise to legal and cultural difficulties.105 In 
order to help foster efficiency and competitiveness of businesses, the 
Commission recommended implementing EU initiatives that tackle only 
specific cross–border issues, where subsidiarity cannot be accomplished and 
Community intervention is the only means to accomplish the goals.106 Also, 
these initiatives allow for reduced uncertainties stemming from the 
harmonization of the defined national issues.107 Companies operating within 
  
 97. Id. at 6–7. 
 98. EC Treaty art. 44(1) (now TFEU art. 50). 
 99. EC Treaty art. 44(g) (now TFEU art. 50(2)(g)). 
 100. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 35. 
 101. EC Treaty art. 44 (2)(c) (now TFEU art. 50(2)(c)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 36. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 9 (“e.g. cross-border merger or 
transfer of seat, cross-border impediments to the exercise of shareholder rights.”). 
 107. Id. 
460 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:2 
the Member States are also given flexibility in circumstances where 
governance structures are considered comparable.108 
In responding to stockholder protection, EU Company Law states that 
“it is necessary to ensure minimum equivalent protection for both 
shareholders and creditors of companies as well as other people doing 
business with companies.”109 EU legislation finds it necessary to guarantee 
that the “principles of equal treatment of shareholders in the same position 
are observed and harmonised.”110 This is necessary to guarantee that 
competition within the internal market is not disrupted by differences in the 
laws of Member States so that Community companies may be able to 
compete equally in global markets.111 Along those same guidelines, legal 
hurdles that hinder company development on the European front must be 
eliminated to allow companies to operate throughout Europe in the same 
fashion they would in their Member State.112 Another important objective of 
EU company law is ensuring protection of investors and the safeguarding of 
investor confidence in the financial markets.113 The Commission provided 
that strengthening shareholder rights and third parties protection was a key 
objective in its Action Plan.114 The Commission indicated this objective to 
be at the core of company law policy and that effectuating a sound 
framework for protection of shareholders and third parties creates a high 
degree of confidence in the business relationship.115 The relevancy of this 
protectionism increases continually due to the increased mobility of 
companies within EU Member States.116 The Commission provided 
guidelines to aide European companies in achieving and maintaining 
efficient protection for stockholders and third parties.117 These guidelines 
provide for the Commission to contemplate new initiatives aimed at 
shareholder rights and providing clarity as to duties of management.118 The 
proposed guidelines also provide for a distinction between the different 
  
 108. Id. 
 109. Council Directive 68/151, recital 5, 1968 O.J. (L 65) 8 (EC); Council Directive 
77/91, recitals 2, 3, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EC); Council Directive 78/855, recital 3, 6, 8, 1978 
O.J. (L 295) 36 (EC). 
 110. Council Directive 77/91, recital 4, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EC). 
 111. MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 36. 
 112. Id. See also Council Regulation 2157/2001/EC, recital 6, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1. 
 113. See Commission Regulation 1606/2002, Application of International Accounting 
Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1; See also, e.g., Council Directive 2003/6, Insider Dealing and 
Market Manipulation, recitals 1, 2, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16. 
 114. See Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 8. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (“The provisions related to the protection of creditors should be modernised 
with a view of maintaining a high quality framework.”). 
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categories of companies119 and provide that company law should facilitate 
and support the use of current information and communication technologies 
by companies in their various relationships with stockholders and third 
parties.120 Lastly, the Commission sought protection of stockholders and 
third parties by implementation of carefully constructed, yet limited amount 
of measures designed at preventing fraud and abuse of legal forms.121 
Aimed towards boosting investor confidence, the Commission 
recommended that “a common approach should be adopted at EU level with 
respect to a few essential rules and adequate coordination of corporate 
governance codes should be ensured.”122 
 After the “dot–com” bubble burst and the financial crisis of Enron and 
WorldCom, the Commission took aim at enhancing corporate governance 
disclosure at the EU company level.123 Under the Action Plan, the 
Commission recommended specific disclosures that should be required in a 
company “Annual Corporate Governance Statement.”124 Specifically, listed 
companies should be required to include at least the following items: (1) 
“the operation of the shareholder meeting and its key powers, and the 
description of the shareholder rights and how they can be exercised;”125  (2) 
the make–up and functionality of the board of directors and its committees; 
(3) the majority shareholders whom own major holdings and those 
shareholders voting rights, control rights and key agreements; (4) other 
direct and indirect relationships among major shareholders and the 
company; (5) any and all material transactions with other related parties; (6) 
existence and character of a risk management system; and (7) “a reference 
code on corporate governance, designated for use at national level, with 
which the company complies or in relation to which it explains 
deviations.”126  
These suggestions work side–by–side with strengthening stockholders’ 
rights because such disclosures allow for access to information by investors. 
Stockholders of listed companies should be furnished relevant information 
regarding the company by use of electronic means in a timely manner in 
advance of the corporation’s Annual General Meetings.127 The Commission 
  
 119. Id. (“A more stringent framework is desirable for listed companies and 
companies which have publicly raised capital. They should be subject to a certain number of 
appropriate detailed rules, in particular in the area of disclosure.”). 
 120. Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 8. 
 121. Id. at 9. 
 122. Id. at 12. 
 123. See generally id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 12–13. 
 127. See Council Directive 2007/36 on the Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders 
in Listed Companies, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 17 (EC). The Annual General Meeting is where 
shareholders come together to exercise their voting rights as shareholders on items placed 
upon the agenda to vote upon. 
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bases its strengthening of shareholders’ rights on the principles of providing 
shareholders with information regarding their numerous existing rights and 
how these rights are utilized, as well as developing the services essential to 
ensure that these rights are effectively employed.128 Stockholders require 
disclosure as a safeguard to ensure the boards of companies they invest in 
are not being mismanaged. One responsibility of a board of directors is 
ensuring the shareholder–director relationship remain strong, since it is 
essential if companies are to continue to raise capital at the lowest cost 
through public financing. In a continued effort to restore confidence in the 
markets, the Commission enhanced directors’ responsibilities by holding the 
entire board collectively responsible for key non–financial and financial 
statements.129 
     The Commission’s Action Plan recommended a modernization of the 
board of directors as part of its plan to modernize EU corporate governance 
policy.130 The Commission recommended three areas for modernization: (1) 
“Board composition,”131 (2) “Directors’ remuneration,”132 and (3) 
“Directors’ responsibilities.”133 The Commission recognized the importance 
of implementing new measures designed primarily for restoration of 
confidence in the markets by its adoption of Commission Directive 
2010/43/EU on July 1, 2010.134 One key area where the Commission 
recommended modernizing deals was with regard to conflicts of interest 
among executive directors, which are directors who are paid for the work 
they perform on the board.135 Decisions which could be considered within 
the spectrum of “conflict of interest” should instead be left to non–executive 
or supervisory directors who are in the majority independent.136 As far as 
nomination of directors for appointment under national law, the 
Commission recommended that this responsibility be assigned to a group 
mainly comprised of executive directors because of their vast knowledge of 
the obstacles that face the company and the experience and skill required to 
  
 128. Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 14. 
 129. Commission Directive 2010/43; see also Modernising Company Law, supra note 
95, at 16. 
 130. See generally Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 15. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 16. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See generally Commission Directive 2010/43 Implementing Directive 
2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as Regards Organisational 
Requirements, Conflicts of Interest, Conduct of Business, Risk Management and Content of 
the Agreement Between a Depositary and a Management Company, 2010 O.J. (L 176) 42 
(EU). [hereinafter Commission Directive 2010/43]. 
 135. See, e.g., Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 15 (“remuneration of 
directors, and supervision of the audit of a company’s accounts.”). 
 136. Commission Directive 2010/43, arts. 18, 19. Commission Directive 2010/43, 
supra note 134, arts. 18, 19. 
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handle these obstacles.137 In an attempt to ensure that a satisfactory control 
mechanism is in place, the EU adopted requiring a permanent compliance 
function and an internal audit function.138 The goal of the audit function is 
to ensure and evaluate that the different control mechanisms which the 
company implemented are followed.139  
 In addition to the enforcement of the control mechanisms, the 
Commission recommended that the appropriate regulatory scheme 
regarding directors’ remuneration should consist of four key components.140 
The first two key components involve disclosure of the “remuneration 
policy in the annual accounts [and] disclosure of details of remuneration of 
individual directors in the annual accounts.”141  The last two components 
involve “prior approval by the shareholder meeting of share and share 
option schemes in which directors participate [and] proper recognition in 
the annual accounts of the costs of such schemes for the company.”142 
C. Lithuania 
 Member States within the EU have their own national laws and their own 
corporate governance regulations... One of these member states is 
Lithuania.. The Republic of Lithuania amends its “Law on Companies” as 
needed, and has amended such Company Law Company Law as recently as 
July 17, 2009.143  In accordance with EU Company Law, the National Stock 
Exchange of Lithuania Corporate Governance Code provides a 
recommended framework of measures companies in the Republic of 
Lithuania should follow.144  The objectives of the Code are to provide basic 
principles which seek to ensure transparent management and operation for 
both domestic and foreign investors; to encourage listed companies to 
continuously improve their governance framework and continuously 
  
 137. See Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 15. 
 138. Commission Directive 2010/43. 
 139. See Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 15 (“In view of the recent 
accounting scandals, special emphasis will be placed on the audit committee [or equivalent 
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both in its external aspects [selecting the external auditor for appointment by shareholders, 
monitoring the relationship with the external auditor including non-audit fees if any] and its 
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2010/43. 
 140. See Modernising Company Law, supra note 95, at 16. 
 141. MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra 
note 90, at 16 (alteration in original). 
 142. Id. (alteration in original). 
 143. Law on Companies, 2000 07 13, No. VIII-1835, as amended by 2009 07 17, No. 
XI–354 (Lith.). 
 144. See NAT’L STOCK EXCH. OF LITH., THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE FOR THE 
COMPANIES LISTED ON THE NATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE OF LITHUANIA, 2004 2 (2004) 
[hereinafter NAT’L STOCK EXCH. OF LITH.].  
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improve disclosure of information; to promote listed companies to develop 
quality management as a method of increasing performance of the 
company; to promote activities which involve the listed companies at the 
international level while at the same time improve domestic and foreign 
investor confidence, as well as the confidences of stakeholders within the 
companies and their corporate governance structure; and to promote 
internationally the activities of the National Stock Exchange of Lithuania to 
improve domestic and foreign investor confidence in the Lithuanian capital 
markets.145 The goals of Company Law in the Republic of Lithuania are 
aligned with those of EU Company Law.  Similar to EU Company Law, the 
Republic of Lithuania provides property and non–property rights for 
shareholders.146 Non–property shareholder rights include the right to attend 
General Meetings of Shareholders; submit of questions to the Company in 
advance of the General Meeting of Shareholders regarding issues on the 
agenda; vote at General Meetings of Shareholders; receive information 
about the company; and file a derivative claim of damages arising out from 
nonfeasance or malfeasance for conduct by a manager of the company and 
members of the Board of their duties listed under the Law on Companies 
and the company’s Articles of Incorporation.147 
 In an effort to provide adequate transparency, the Republic of Lithuania 
requires that companies provide a response to questions regarding issues on 
the agenda of the General Meeting.148  Questions from shareholders to the 
company must be received no later than three working days before the 
General Meeting.149  Lithuanian Company Law does not require that 
companies reveal trade secrets or other confidential information; yet it does 
require that companies inform the shareholders that answering such a 
question would reveal confidential information and thus cannot be 
answered.150  Lithuanian Company Law provides shareholders with the right 
to vote in accordance with the rights carried by the type of shares owned.151 
With the common goal of regaining confidences in capital markets, the 
Lithuanian Company Law affords shareholders the right to information 
concerning the company.152  In order for shareholders to provide 
shareholders with information, a written request must be sent to the 
  
 145. Id. 
 146. See generally Law on Companies, art. 14. 
 147. Law on Companies, art. 15. 
 148. Law on Companies, art. 16. See also First Council Directive 68/151/EEC, art. 58, 
1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. (“on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the 
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 149. Law on Companies, art. 16. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Law on Companies, art. 17. 
 152. Law on Companies, art. 18. 
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company and within seven days of receiving such a request, the company is 
required to provide access or copies of the information to the shareholder.153  
 In order to protect the rights of shareholders, Lithuanian Company Law 
provides that “the management organs of the company must act for the 
benefit of the company and its shareholders . . . .” The structure of 
management in Lithuania is governed by a single company manager, a 
collegial supervisory body composed of the Supervisory Board and a 
collegial management organ (the “Board.”)154  The Supervisory Board may 
or may not be formed within the company; if the Supervisory Board is not 
formed from within the company, then the duties allocated to its scope of 
powers shall be executed by the company manager.155  In furtherance of 
providing corporate governance transparency, companies may elect or 
remove the manager of the company either by the Board, or—if there is no 
Board—by the General Meeting of Shareholders.156  In addition to electing 
the manager, this governing body will also set the manager’s salary, 
approve his job description, including the duties he must fulfill while in 
office, offer incentives and impose penalties.157 Possessing both a 
Supervisory Board and a separate Management Board facilitates a clear 
separation of management and functions delegated to the Supervisory Board 
allowing for a transparent and efficient management process.158 In the 
formation of the Management Board, the Stock Exchange of Lithuania 
posits that providing a mechanism that ensures objective and fair 
monitoring operates to safeguard shareholder rights and impart 
accountability upon the Supervisory Board to the shareholders.159 To ensure 
independence, the Stock Exchange of Lithuania proposes that for a member 
  
 153. Id.  Upon a written request from shareholders, companies must give access or 
provide copies of the following documents:  
 
[T]he Articles of Association of the company, set of annual financial 
statements, annual reports of the company, the auditor’s opinion and 
audit reports, minutes of the General Meetings of Shareholders or other 
documents executing decisions of the General Meetings of 
Shareholders, the recommendations and responses of Supervisory Board 
to the General Meetings of Shareholders, the lists of shareholders, the 
lists of members of the Supervisory Board and the Board, also other 
documents of the company that must be publicly accessible under laws 
as well as minutes of the meetings of the Supervisory Board and the 
Board or other documents executing decisions of the above-mentioned 
company organs, unless these documents contain a commercial 
(industrial) secret of the company, confidential information.   
 
Id.   
 154. Law on Companies, art. 19. 
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 156. Law on Companies, art. 37. 
 157. Id.   
 158. NATI’L STOCK EXCH. OF LITH., supra note 144, at 3. 
 159. Id. at 3. 
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to serve on the Management Board, the member is not deemed independent 
when the member: (1) is connected or is the controlling shareholder of the 
company; (2) previously served as chief executive officer or another 
empowered employee of the company within the previous three years; (3) 
served as head of the company that consulted with the company within the 
previous three years; (4) currently is a client or major supplier of the 
company or head, employee, or member of said supplier or client; (5) 
currently is bound by material contractual agreements with the company; 
(6) previously served as a member of a collegial body of the company for a 
period that may be considered long enough to influence the determination of 
that member to act in the best interests of the company; and (7) has relations 
that potentially can cause a conflict of interest and influence the 
determination of that member to act in the best interests of the company.160  
In comparison, Delaware General Corporation Law § 144 takes aim at the 
independence of the directors of Delaware incorporated firms.161 The DGCL 
permits interested directors to attend, participate, or even vote so long as: 
(1) material information regarding the interested director’s relationship to 
the subject transaction are made known to the board and the board acts in 
good faith in voting affirmatively for the transaction, even if disinterested 
directors make up less than quorum, or; (2) the interested director discloses 
such material information to the shareholders and the shareholders in good 
faith vote affirmatively for the subject transaction, or; (3) the subject 
transaction is fair to the corporation at the time it is authorized, approved or 
ratified, by the directors, a committee or by the stockholders.162 For the 
Board to avoid possible conflicts of interest, the Stock Exchange of 
Lithuania recommends the Board establish an Audit Committee, a 
Remuneration Committee, and a Nomination Committee.163 The tasks these 
Committees perform offer greater management transparency and continue 
the restoration of confidence in the Lithuanian capital markets. 
The Board’s powers enumerated in Lithuanian Company Law also serve 
the goal of protecting shareholders and offering transparency.164 The Board 
is entrusted with determining the proper operating strategy of the company 
and the proper management structure and placement of its employees.165 To 
further the confidence in Lithuanian capital markets, Lithuanian Company 
Law provides checks and balances by requiring that the Board oversee 
information offered by the manager of the company regarding the 
implementation of the company’s operating strategy and the organization of 
the company’s financial status and activities.166  The General Meeting of 
  
 160. Id. at 3–4. 
 161. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2010). 
 162. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) – (3) (West 2010). 
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Shareholders offers many exclusive rights involving actions of the 
company, including (1) amending the Articles of Incorporation of the 
company; (2) electing or removing members of the Supervisory Board, 
collegial board or the manager of the company; and (3) selecting and 
removing auditors of the firm that perform the audit of financial 
statements.167   
II. EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
 Boards have increased their focus on risk management techniques and 
issues of executive remuneration in an attempt to restore investor 
confidence in the capital markets after the volatility of the previous decade.  
After the financial crisis in 2008, public outcry grew over the excessive 
executive compensation policies and over the intertwining connection 
between these policies and the risk taking and short term mindset.168 In the 
United States, this has led to regulation under Dodd–Frank regarding “say–
on–pay,” “clawbacks,” and “compensation consultant independence.”169 
Due to the changes enacted by Dodd–Frank, proxy disclosure regulations 
require information concerning executive compensation in regards to the 
relationship of compensation policies to risk, to the compensation 
consultant independence and to the reporting of stock options and other 
equity awards.170 As a result of Dodd–Frank, disclosure of compensation 
risk is only mandated in a few limited situations.171 With the new 
regulations in force, corporations must now disclose compensation policies 
used for all employees, “and their risk management philosophy only if the 
risks arising from their compensation programs are ‘reasonably likely to 
have a material adverse effect’ on the company.”172 Shearman & Sterling’s 
Survey of Corporate Governance (“Shearman Survey”) found proxy 
statements to be consistent regarding components listed to support a 
corporation’s finding that policies dealing with compensation do not pose a 
risk to the venture.173 The Shearman Survey provided that of the Top 100 
  
 167. Law on Companies, art. 20. 
 168. Thoughts for Boards, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 169. See generally Dodd–Frank Act. 
 170. Survey from Shearman & Sterling LLP, 2010 Corporate Governance of the 
Largest US Public Companies – Director & Executive Compensation (2010), available at 
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 171. Id. at 4. 
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 173. Id. at 5 (including listed items such as: “providing a mix of cash and equity and 
of annual and longer-term incentives; using multiple metrics to determine payout in order not 
to put too much emphasis on any single measure; caps on incentive and award payouts; share 
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periods; and implementing and enforcing clawback policies”). 
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Companies in the United States, eighty–six provided disclosure of some 
level of “risk” in their proxy statement.174 Additionally, of the Top 100 
Companies, seventy–one indicated that they maintain a “clawback policy,” 
which triggers after the occurrence of specific events that affect the 
corporation’s financial statements.175  
 The perplexing problem regarding how improvements in boardroom 
corporate governance can be made often draws regulators’ attention to 
investigating what actions may have caused the investors to lose confidence 
in the first place.  Investors list executive remuneration as a key reason for 
their lack of confidence in the capital markets.176 Compensation by means 
of stock options, bonuses, and cash incentives at corporations has been a 
method of rewarding boards and other executives for risky, but profitable, 
business measures undertaken on behalf of the corporation.177 This dilemma 
begins with a review of compensation programs previously in place, which 
rewarded directors for short–term goals as opposed to the corporation’s 
long–term corporate strategy.178 Regulations are being enacted in hopes of 
restoring investor confidence after the financial crisis...  In order for 
investor confidence to return, investors must once again believe that a 
“board’s risk oversight responsibility derives primarily from state law 
fiduciary duties, federal laws and regulations, stock exchange listing 
requirements and certain established (and evolving) best practices.”179 
 Delaware—as the primary authority for corporation law—has developed 
a framework for the fiduciary duties of corporations.180 Generally, the rule 
laid out in Caremark imposes director liability only for a failure of 
oversight where there is “sustained or systemic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure [that] a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists.”181 The Caremark court 
also indicated that this is a “demanding test.”182 Since Caremark, Delaware 
courts have stressed their interpretation of its holding, positing that no 
Caremark liability would ensue unless the “directors intentionally failed 
entirely to implement any reporting or information system or controls or, 
having implemented such a system, intentionally refused to monitor the 
  
 174. Id. at 18 (“None of these companies concluded that compensation–related risks 
are reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the company.”) 
 175. Id. at 28. (Noting that eight more Top 100 Companies disclosed adoption of a 
clawback policy that will go into effect after 2010. 
       176.   See generally Board of Directors, supra note 3; see generally Where Main Street 
Meets the C–Suite, supra note 49; See generally 2010 Corporate Governance, supra note 
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system or act on warnings it provided.”183 The Delaware perspective views 
risk oversight on the small scale dealing with risk oversight by a board of 
directors on individual decisions. In comparison, the recently enacted 
Dodd–Frank legislation imposes risk oversight fiduciary duties on a larger 
scale dealing with risk oversight and the series of decisions and rationale 
behind those decisions. 
 The Dodd–Frank legislation concerns itself more with risk management 
disclosure issues rather than solely focused on risk oversight functions.184  
While both aspects of risk are important, Dodd–Frank takes aim at directors 
of corporations who follow risk oversight procedures, but make short–term 
decisions out–of–line with the corporation’s long–term corporate 
strategy.185 The conflict arises between the directors’ short–term decisions 
being linked to director compensation and the short–term decisions not 
being in the best interests of the company and their long–term corporate 
strategy.186 Dodd–Frank has thus imposed new rules relating to executive 
remuneration by requiring a non–binding shareholder vote on executive 
pay187 and establishing new guidelines as to independence of members of 
compensation committees.188 Regarding executive remuneration, the Act 
also requires disclosures of executive pay in comparison to the financial 
performance of the company and the ratio of the Chief Executive Officer’s 
pay to the median pay of every all other employees of the said company.189 
Dodd–Frank also requires “clawbacks,” which mandate recovery by the 
company of funds dispersed to executive officers for improprieties or other 
certain financial restatements made by the company and its executive 
officers.190 One of the most controversial provisions in the Dodd–Frank Act 
involves proxy access. This somewhat controversial provision in Dodd–
Frank would provide shareholders the right—contingent on the 
shareholder’s ownership stake in the company—to include a list of 
candidates for board positions in the company.191 
 As the United States adapts to investors’ call for executive compensation 
regulation, the European Union adapts as well. In the EU numerous member 
states currently mandate executive remuneration for listed companies be 
associated with individual and corporate performance.192 This required 
association has brought additional focus on ensuring that compensation is 
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structured to not incentivize and avoid inappropriate risk taking.193 As 
recently as April 2009, the European Commission issued a non–binding 
recommendation in an effort to institute controls on risk taking.194 The 
recommendation provides that “the compensation of executives of all listed 
companies should be principally based on performance and be in the long-
term interests of the company.”195 The Commission recommends that 
certain measures be enacted to further this goal: “(1) limits on the amount of 
variable compensation; (2) the deferral of a significant portion of variable 
compensation; (3) imposing performance conditions on variable 
compensation; and (4) clawbacks of variable compensation awarded on the 
basis of data that proves to be manifestly misstated.”196 Clawback 
provisions are becoming more common in the United States, yet such 
policies are few and far between among EU countries.197 However, a 
number of EU countries have adopted advisory “say–on–pay” shareholder 
voting procedures that have helped voice shareholder concerns for executive 
compensation procedures.198 Nevertheless, if shareholders vote significantly 
against procedures disclosed to them for vote, the results from the non–
binding vote provide great feedback for boards so that they may consider 
alternatives to avoid future backlash.  While both the United States and the 
European Union indicate progress in regulation of executive compensation, 
neither indicates whether such changes have affected investor confidence in 
capital markets.  
III. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE     
 Currently in the United States, federal regulation has increasingly 
targeted actions which previously were regulated solely by state law. State 
laws previously regulated such actions as disclosure and shareholders voting 
rights until federal regulation usurped these actions in order to provide 
greater transparency and confidence in the capital markets. Regulation in 
the United States has and continues to be bountiful and swift since recent 
financial crises. In the United States each crisis has been followed almost 
immediately with some form of regulation.  This trend will likely continue 
perpetually until market equilibrium is found. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002 followed after the “dot–com” bubble burst, the September 11th 
terrorist attacks, and the Enron and WorldCom financial scandals. The 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and 
other regulatory actions followed as a result of the financial crisis of 2008 
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and 2009—which stemmed from the “sub–prime meltdown”—causing the 
“housing bubble” to burst. 
 In the European Union, the trend follows a continued improvement 
approach towards modification of corporate governance. This EU approach 
to modification of corporate governance may be largely due to the fact that 
the EU is a relatively new body, whereas the United States is relatively old 
in comparison. As a result, the EU approach seems to be aimed at 
discovering what the law of the land should be and to continue to modify 
the law. Alternatively, the U.S. tweaks its corporate governance laws over 
time, only after crises or other similar situations provoke action necessary to 
remedy existing problems.  Although the EU approach to corporate 
governance regulation is more time consuming, it seems to be broader and 
forward–looking at potential stumbling blocks that could interfere with 
progress. Unlike the EU, the United States’ traditional approach takes aim at 
removing the stumbling blocks after an event occurs, which requires making 
a change to the regulation. This difference can be summarized simply as the 
U.S. living and learning from their mistakes, whereas the EU approach 
seems to use a slow yet forward looking method of preparation to avoid 
future potential obstacles of its regulation. Recently, the pattern of U.S. 
regulation seems to have made a change from the “learn from mistake” 
approach through enacting the Dodd–Frank Act.  In adopting Dodd–Frank, 
the United States has taken a forward looking approach to corporate 
governance by providing proxy access to shareholders, allowing for non–
binding “say–on–pay” voting, and providing “clawback” provisions. It 
seems the U.S. is starting to aim at both providing a remedy for problems 
past and at solving future potential problems in the shareholder–director 
relationship. However, opponents of Dodd–Frank argue that Congress does 
not have the Constitutional power to enact such broad sweeping legislation 
as it did in Dodd–Frank—causing several aspects of Dodd–Frank to remain 
contested and not in force. 
 Not only must the European Union make necessary changes reflecting the 
capital markets in the EU—it must also make regulatory changes in reaction 
to events occurring in the United States. After the enactment of the 
Sarbanes–––Oxley Act of 2002, European Union corporations seeking 
expansion into the United States are required to follow U.S. laws relevant to 
their operation. Specifically, EU corporations operating in the United States 
were required to follow disclosure requirements implicated by Sarbanes–
Oxley. Additionally, with recent adoption of Dodd–Frank, EU incorporated 
companies are required to follow additional requirements. EU–based 
companies must now inquire as to what the laws of the United States require 
of them and adapt. This problem results in a barrier of entry for cross–
border expansion. Finding a resolution to this problem helps improve the 
capital markets of both EU–based companies and U.S.–based companies 
alike by providing growth opportunities into the markets.    
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IV. AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM WITH AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION  
The future of international corporate governance is headed towards the 
general framework currently utilized in the European Union. The EU 
framework sets out a few broad directives—which must be followed by 
all—and then the EU Commission provides recommendations for smooth 
transitions cross–border.  While the United States and European Union both 
operate differently, the focus of corporate governance in the United States 
begins at local or state regulation followed by federal regulation.  As 
corporations today grow into global conglomerates, cross–border issues 
continue to arise resulting in the need for a set of international guidelines on 
corporate governance. Companies seeking global expansion often find 
expansion difficult due to confusion and a lack of clarity in interpreting the 
rules and regulations imposed by other countries. The United States 
operates with state to state jurisdictional differences and there remain 
several federal regulations placed upon each and every company.  Unlike 
the United States, the EU operates by placing several directives upon 
corporations as to how they may or may not operate and additionally 
provides them with recommendations that the EU Commission believe to be 
actions considered “good” governance. As corporations continue the 
outward trend of becoming international conglomerates, problems arise 
when boards are not familiar with the rules and regulations of the countries 
in which they seek expansion.   
To remedy this problem, I propose the establishment of an International 
Corporate Governance Regulatory Agency (“ICGRA”). The purpose of this 
Agency will be to establish a set of cross–border guidelines that are to be 
followed by both the United States and the European Union, and thus will 
synthesize the similarities between both entities in order to provide 
standards when companies seek cross–border expansion.  These cross–
border guidelines would be followed by corporations with operations in 
more than one country or member state, in either the United States or 
European Union. The fusion of the corporate governance similarities will 
provide companies opportunities to expand into new markets and help 
remove obstacles that previously stood in the way of growth.  This would be 
similar to the European Union corporate governance ideology of freedom to 
establishment.199 These synergies will provide a foundation for companies 
seeking expansion and how they should begin their expansion efforts. 
The ICGRA would also act similar to the EU Commission by providing 
recommendations for what it believes to be “good” governance features. 
The ICGRA would provide recommendations for major issues such as: 
executive remuneration, risk management, proxy access and fiduciary duties 
owed by boards of directors. The ICGRA’s recommendations would not 
apply solely to the EU or United States, but such recommendations would 
  
 199. See generally MANTYSAARI, supra note 1, at 35. 
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be offered for companies operating in both the United States and EU capital 
markets...  These synergies would have a wide–range effect that would 
allow EU companies and U.S. companies alike to expand into new global 
markets that were previously unavailable to them. 
In providing such synergies, the ICGRA would be able to operate in 
tandem with local and national regulatory authorities in dealing with 
corporate governance issues because both are seeking the same goal of 
improved corporate governance regulations. These regulations, whether 
enacted regionally, nationally or by the ICGRA would act to pre-empt 
further problems typically not addressed by both United States and 
European Union based corporations. Implementation of these ICGRA 
recommendations would take regulations that were previously solely United 
States based or solely European Union based and work to implement a 
recommendation that would aim towards both the United States and 
European Union. Such regulations would have the effect of allowing 
efficiencies in the market place where previously one market has fallen 
behind the other. 
The ICGRA would be managed by an international committee composed 
of members from corporate governance regulatory agencies in the United 
States and the EU. Members on the committee would include congressional 
committee members and representatives from the SEC and NYSE for the 
United States delegation. In the EU, committee members will be selected 
from the EU Commission and representatives from different Member States 
in order to provide an international perspective to the ICGRA committee. 
The diversity gained from such widespread representation will aid the 
ICGRA in forming recommendations that address issues at the forefront of 
each regulatory body. With the trend of international representatives on the 
board of directors of global companies, forming the ICGRA committee in a 
similar fashion helps the ICGRA stay abreast to potential communication 
issues that companies encounter and resolve such issues by forming 
recommendations to account for potential communication conflicts.200  This 
format gives the ICGRA an opportunity to learn about problems other 
regulatory agencies face before they become problems on a larger scale. 
Learning about these problems earlier and enacting recommendations to 
resolve potential issues can halt or at least slow down a potentially global 
problem by addressing it during its early stages. Such diverse representation 
on the international committee will enhance the transparency and 
understandability of the ICGRA’s recommendations.  Another benefit of 
committee diversity is the opportunity of each member to voice any issues 
or concerns they may find while forming recommendations. By raising 
issues or concerns prior to issuing a formal recommendation, the ICGRA 
can work together and resolve potential conflicts before they arise while at 
  
 200. See Banham, supra note 2. 
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the same time providing clarity for companies located in both the United 
States and European Union.  
 Everyday corporations are facing new obstacles in the marketplace, some 
local, some regional, some national, and now even global obstacles 
challenge corporations.  With implementation of the ICGRA, the United 
States and European Union will be taking a prospective approach toward 
corporate governance. By working together, the ICGRA will look to remove 
potential obstacles that could stand in the way of corporate development and 
growth across borders. The elimination of confusion and guidance from the 
ICGRA will provide easier entry into foreign markets than ever before. 
Effectively utilizing the ICGRA will have short-term and long–term 
benefits. In the short-term, the ICGRA will provide clarity to regulations 
and standards required for entry into cross-border marketplaces. In the 
long–term, when investors begin seeing the benefits provided from the 
ICGRA, the decrease in crises because of early actions and the growth in 
corporate expansion due to the clarity provided by the ICGRA, investor 
confidences in the markets will be restored. 
CONCLUSION 
 The international corporate governance marketplace changes with each 
transaction, decision, or meeting; from the smallest family–owned shop to 
international conglomerates, addressing issues these companies face is a 
daunting task. Difficulties arise when determining which issues require 
most immediate action.  Addressing these issues properly can prevent future 
crises, provide smooth transitions into markets and help stabilize and restore 
investor confidences in the marketplaces. By establishing an international 
agency whose job is to address potential future issues that could arise in the 
United States and European Union marketplaces, ICGRA could help 
prevent a small issue from developing into a crisis. The ICGRA will provide 
clarity to regulations and standards that corporations are required to abide 
by in order to expand into new marketplaces. By addressing the issues that 
investors are most concerned with, the ICGRA will offer an opportunity for 
restoring investor confidence in the markets. 
 






